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EUROPE 1992  promises  substantial  economic gains to the 12  nations  that 
are to make  up the single  integrated  market.  From  the larger  market  are 
to flow the microeconomic  benefits  of economies of scale and increased 
competition.  It is these gains that are the promise of Europe 1992;  the 
gains  from  macroeconomic  policy come largely  from  capitalizing  on the 
supply-side  shock of lower prices and  costs. 
A quantitative  estimate  of the gains was made in a widely publicized 
report, sponsored by the Commission  of the European  Communities, 
known  as the Cecchini  report.  ' The report  estimates  the microeconomic 
gains to be 4.3 percent to 6.4 percent of gross domestic product, with 
appropriate  accompanying  macroeconomic  policies adding  another  2.5 
percent.2  It is a one-time  gain  analogous  to those achieved  by eliminating 
a domestic monopoly  or a tariff.  Lest the estimated  gain seem small, it 
is several times the estimated  gain of 1 percent of GDP from the 1968 
elimination  of tariffs on industrial  products among the then-Common 
Market  members.3  To state the relative  size of the gains  in another  way, 
the midpoint  of the report's estimates of the microeconomic  welfare 
gains from Europe 1992  is 216 billion  European  currency  units (ECU), 
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the text. The author  is much  indebted  to these three  for their  help. Research  support  was 
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1. Emerson  (1988).  The report  was prepared  under  the supervision  of Paolo Cecchini 
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277 278  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
or $263 billion-about  $810 for every man, woman, and child in the 
Community.4 
The first part of this paper examines how the report arrives at its 
estimates.  The microeconomic  task was formidable-a prediction  of the 
difference  between the prices and costs expected in the single Commu- 
nity market  and  those expected from  continuation  of the status  quo. The 
effort and care applied to the task is impressive; many of the leading 
European  economists  and  consulting  firms  were enlisted  in the research, 
and the results occupy some 15 volumes. Paolo Cecchini  observes that 
the research  was unprecedented  "for  the sheer  size of its scope, but  also 
because of the novelty of the subject matter and the methodological 
difficulties  ...  based  on it. A further  problem  was the unevenness  of the 
empirical data on European market fragmentation.  Yet despite the 
fragilities,  the results  that  emerge  tell an unmistakable  story."5 
That a single European  market  will raise real incomes is a "story" 
that few economists would dispute. Yet I believe that the details of the 
story are more questionable,  that certain  economic assumptions,  limi- 
tations,  and  omissions  make  the  report's  estimates  of the  gains  optimistic. 
It is important  to emphasize  this overoptimism,  given the significance  of 
the report  both as a work of economic advocacy and as an impressive 
scientific  study. 
A second problem  in the report  is its bold  political  assumption  that  all 
12 nations  of the Community  will cooperate  with the removal  of all the 
barriers to a single integrated Community  market. Removing these 
barriers  represents  the classic problem  of political  economy. The Com- 
munity  as a whole is a gainer,  but well-organized  groups  in each nation 
will be  losers and can be  expected to  resist the efforts to  create 
Community  gains at their expense. The second section examines this 
critical  problem. 
The last part of the paper examines the impact of Europe 1992 on 
American  firms  operating  in Europe.  It also looks briefly  at the question 
of the regulation  of mergers  by the Community. 
4. Cecchini  (1988, p. 107). The dollar  amount  is based on an exchange  rate of 1.00 
ECU to $1.22, the mid-March  1988  rate. The per capita  calculations  are by the author. 
These estimates  are  in 1988  prices. 
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Table 1. Estimates  of Total  Welfare  Gains  for Seven  European  Countries 
from Completing  the Internal  Market  under  Two Sets of Assumptionsa 
Percent  of GDP 
Estimateb 
Item  A  B 
Direct gains from  elimination  of barriers 
Stage 1: barriers  affecting  trade  only  0.2  0.3 
Stage 2: other barriers  affecting  production  2.0  2.4 
Subtotal  2.2  2.7 
Indirect gains from  market integration 
Stage 3: economies of scale from restructuring  and increased  production  2.0  2.1 
Stage 4: competition  effects on X-inefficiency  1.6  1.6 
Subtotalc 
Variant  I (sum of stages 3 and 4 above)  3.6  3.7 
Variant  II (stages 3 and 4 computed  jointly)  2.1  2.1 
Total gains 
Variant  I  5.8  6.4 
Variant  II  4.3  4.8 
Source:  Emerson  (1988,  table 10.1.1). 
a. Estimates  based  on 1985  data  at 1985  prices. 
b. The A and B estimates  reflect  differing  data sources  or assumptions  introduced  in stages I and 2. At stage 1, 
the A estimates  are based on a study  of the cost of border  barriers  by a consulting  firm,  and the B estimates  are 
based on costs from  a 3,000-firm  survey. At stage 2, the A estimates  assume  no reduction  in prices  for steel and 
agricultural  products,  and  B estimates  assume  prices  in both  sectors  decline  5 percent.  These  two sectors  are special 
cases since the Community,  through  the European  Iron  and  Steel Commission  and  the Common  Agricultural  Policy, 
sets prices  and  outputs. 
c.  For explanations  of variants  I and II, see the text. 
The Gains from  1992 
Table 1 lays out the estimates  in the Cecchini report of the microec- 
onomic gains from creating the Community market. The estimates  are 
for  seven  European  countries  (Germany,  France,  Italy,  the  United 
Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands,  and Luxembourg) that account for 
88 percent  of  total  Community  GDP.6 Data  were  available  for these 
seven;  the  assumption  was  that  the  remaining  five  countries  in  the 
Community would realize gains of the same percentage of their GDPs. 
The gains in table 1 do not assume enactment of what the report calls 
the appropriate accompanying  macroeconomic  policy,  though one im- 
plicit assumption is full employment-that  resources  released  by cost 
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reductions  will be employed elsewhere in the economy. The estimates 
are partial  equilibrium  ones in the sense that they "add up estimates 
made independently for many individual sectors, and do not work 
through  the 'general  equilibrium'  results that would take into account 
changes in relative prices."7 The results from a general equilibrium 
model  are said  to differ  insignificantly,  and  time and  data  constraints  are 
said  to have precluded  the general  equilibrium  approach. 
The objective is to measure  welfare  gains-the  increase  in consumer 
surplus  less the loss in producer  surplus.  In the calculations,  however, 
price  reductions  are  often assumed  to match  cost reductions,  leaving  the 
producer surplus  per unit unchanged. Agriculture,  financial  services, 
and  coal are  exceptions. For example,  three-fifths  of the price  reduction 
in agriculture  is considered a reduction  in rents; the remainder,  a net 
welfare  gain.8 
The starting  point  for table 1 is the estimate  made  by Richard  Cawley 
and  Michael  Davenport,  who use partial  equilibrium  analysis  to calculate 
the direct welfare gains from creating  the Community  market  for each 
sector (stages 1 and 2). The larger  indirect  gains that  result  from  greater 
economies of scale and increased  competition  (stages 3 and 4) are not 
directly  estimated.  Instead,  the  estimates  are  derived  from  the simulation 
of the Alasdair  Smith and Anthony Venables model of trade in imper- 
fectly competitive  markets.  The  particular  sectoral  calculations  of Smith 
and Venables are then generalized  to derive coefficients  with which to 
estimate  the indirect  gains  as a multiple  of the direct  gains  in each sector, 
as estimated  by Cawley  and  Davenport.9 
Estimates  of Direct  Gains 
To estimate the direct gains, Cawley and Davenport quantify the 
economic  costs of existing  barriers,  including  borderformalities,  national 
diversity of product standards,  or, more generally, nontariff  barriers 
that create a wedge between the price of domestic goods and delivered 
exports.'0  The Cawley and Davenport  model for stage 1 uses a three- 
7. Ibid., p. 202. 
8. Ibid., pp. 232-34. 
9. Ibid., pp. 234, 242-45. 
10. Cawley  and  Davenport  (1988,  p. 93). Merton J. Peck  281 
country framework  with a single Community  country importing  from 
the rest of the Community  and the rest of the world. The welfare  gains 
to the Community  from 1992  for each sector are totaled  by calculating, 
for each of seven Community  countries,  the gains to the single country 
and  the gains  to the rest  of the Community  from  removal  of trade  barriers 
on final  demand  goods.  "  I 
The estimate for the electrical machinery  sector illustrates  the pro- 
cedure. From a consultant's  study, the reduction  in costs with a single 
European  market  is estimated  to be 1.4 percent of the current  costs of 
production.  This procedure  results in a price reduction  of 0.7 percent- 
reflecting  the impact  of price  elasticities  along  with  cost reductions.  With 
the lower price in the Community,  imports  from the rest of the world 
decline by 0.6 percent. All the percentages  are weighted averages for 
seven member  states. 
The welfare gain is estimated by the standard  partial equilibrium 
technique  as the sum  of the changes  in producer  and consumer  surplus. 
The gain  depends  on the percentage  cost reduction,  the export  elasticity 
of supply  for the rest of the world, and the import  elasticity of demand 
for the Community.  In the case of electrical  machinery,  the welfare  gain 
is 100  million  ECU. 
Stage  2 estimates  are  derived  in the same  general  way, except that  the 
Community  is treated as one economic unit. The important  aspect of 
stage  2 is that  the effect of price reductions  in intermediate  goods on the 
price of final demand goods is estimated by use of an input-output 
matrix.  12 
Cawley and Davenport acknowledge that their analysis assumes 
perfectly  competitive  markets  and  omits  the costs of adjustment,  as well 
as the time required  to achieve the new equilibrium.  The data  required 
to estimate their model include trade and production  volumes, import 
and export elasticities, and estimates of potential cost  reductions. 
Estimates  of cost reductions  are taken  from  firm  surveys and particular 
sectoral  studies done for their  project.'3 The elasticities are taken from 
previous work and extrapolated for sectors in which there are no 
published  elasticities. 
11. Ibid.,  pp. 498-99. 
12. Ibid.,  pp. 502-06. 
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Estimates  of Indirect Gains 
Indirect gains (stages 3 and 4 of  the estimates) come from the 
realization  of economies  of scale, from  the restructuring  of industry,  and 
from  the elimination  of X-inefficiencies  by the pressure  of more  compet- 
itive markets. (X-inefficiencies,  or, more popularly, corporate slack, 
arise because competitive pressures are weak and firms can operate 
below their  production  frontiers.) 
A simple example illustrates  what is to happen. Assume three firms 
exist, each a monopolist  in its national  market.  Now the three national 
markets  become one community  market.  Two firms  survive,  each selling 
in all three national  markets  and each with a higher  volume. The higher 
volume allows each to realize  economies of scale. Lower costs, in turn, 
are assumed to result in lower prices, thus providing  one source of the 
welfare gains. The two remaining  firms  are now in direct competition 
with one another. Concentration  has declined and the surviving  firms, 
under  greater  competitive  pressure,  reduce their  corporate  slack-thus 
further  reducing their costs and prices. This is the second source of 
welfare  gains. The  larger  market  then  provides  both  a greater  realization 
of economies of scale and increased  competition. 
As table 1  indicates,  there  are  two estimates  of indirect  gains, variants 
I and II, although  both rely on the Smith  and Venables  model. Variant  I 
computes separately  the gains from economies of scale and the gains 
from the elimination  of corporate slack; variant II computes the two 
gains  jointly, relying solely on the coefficients derived  from the Smith 
and Venables  model.  14 
The welfare  calculations  used in the report  assume  Cournot  behavior 
by oligopolists  (each  firm  sets its output  while  taking  other  firms'  outputs 
as given)and  integrated  markets,  in which firms  have no ability  to price- 
discriminate  among  national  markets.15  Smith  and  Venables  also provide 
the results from employing  other assumptions, including  Bertrand  be- 
havior  (each firm  sets its price while taking  other  firms'  prices as given) 
and segmented markets, in which firms retain some ability to charge 
higher  prices in their national  markets,  because consumers  have some 
preference  for products  traditionally  sold in their  markets. 
14. Emerson  (1988,  pp. 240-43). 
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Smith and Venables divide the world into six "countries," France, 
Germany,  Italy, the United Kingdom, the "rest of the EC," and the 
"rest of the world." For 10 industries,  they estimate the welfare gains 
from  the comparative  statics of a transition  from six national  markets  to 
a united European  market.  As noted in the example, the single market 
reduces  industry  concentration  faced  by each member  country  and  thus, 
it is assumed, increases competition  to eliminate X-inefficiency. The 
larger  market  also allows greater  economies of scale. 
Data required  by the model include trade flows among countries, 
domestic production  statistics, the Herfindahl  index by sector for each 
country,  measures  of economies of scale, and  elasticities  of demand  for 
each sector. Necessary data  are  often  not  available,  requiring  the authors 
to substitute  arbitrary  estimates. For example, production  data  for the 
"rest of the world" are chosen so that  the ratio  of production  to exports 
to the,  EC is the same as that for the average  of the four individual  EC 
countries. Estimates of the Herfindahl  index for industries in each 
country  involve similar  arbitrary  assignments.'6 
Variant II,  the easier to describe, uses the results  from  the Smith  and 
Venables model to calculate the ratio of indirect to direct gains (as 
calculated  by Cawley  and  Davenport)  for 10  industries.  The  ratio  depends 
on how much  the shift  from  a national  to a Community  market  reduces 
the  concentration  faced  by each  country  and  hence  increases  competition 
and how much  that shift  permits  the realization  of greater  economies of 
scale. 
In some industries  there are no indirect  gains, for national  markets 
are already so  fragmented that there are no gains from increased 
competition  and no unrealized  economies of scale. Thus  agriculture  has 
a zero ratio or coefficient:  that is, there will be no indirect  gains, given 
its already  fragmented  market  structure.  Textiles have,h  ratio  of 1.0:  that 
is, indirect and direct gains are equal and the shift to a Community 
market  will lead to a reduction in its concentration  that will result in 
somewhat  greater  competition  and  economies of scale. Motor  vehicles, 
now highly  concentrated  in national  markets,  have a ratio  of 6.0: that  is, 
indirect gains are six times the direct gains because the shift to a 
Community  market  will significantly  lower concentration  and  permit  the 
realization  of substantial  economies of scale. Large  indirect  gains occur 
in industries  that  are now highly  concentrated  in their  national  markets. 
16. Smith  and  Venables  (1988,  pp. 294-97). 284  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Competition  (the greatest source of indirect gains) is assumed to be 
determined  by market  concentration,  the share  held  by the largest  firms. 
This procedure  gives the variant II  estimates shown for stage 3 and 
stage  4 in table 1.17 Since Smith  and Venables  perform  calculations  only 
for 4 countries and 10 industries, estimated ratios or coefficients are 
derived  for other  industries  and  the rest of the Community  by prodigious 
extrapolations.  18 
Variant  I separates  gains from economies of scale and gains due to 
increased competition. The latter are again computed  from the Smith 
and Venables model using the procedures  described  for variant  II, but 
only to compute  the effect of the reduction  in concentration  and  resulting 
increased competition. The estimates of the gains from realization  of 
economies of scale are based on models  by Joachim  Schwalbach  and  by 
Rodolfo Heig and Pippo Ranci that focus on the current  gap between 
plant size and minimum  efficient  technical  scale (METS),  as estimated, 
in turn, in a study by Cliff Pratten.  The calculations  of gains based on 
these studies are done by Michael Aujean.'9  He assumes Community 
trade increases by 25 percent with an integrated  market. The larger 
market, in turn, is assumed to reduce the gap between plant size and 
METS, leading to cost reductions. The cost reductions vary among 
industries,  depending  on the magnitude  of the current  gap and the size 
of the costs of a shortfall  from optimal scale. The cost reductions, in 
turn,  are converted  to the welfare  gains using partial  equilibrium  analy- 
SiS  .20 
The simulations  for both variants  assume  that  economies of scale will 
be realized  and  that the number  of firms  will adjust  to numbers  required 
for the lowest-cost production. By assumption, markets will be in 
equilibrium,  yet real  markets,  even the most competitive,  are  frequently 
in disequilibrium.  Competition  is assumed  to be determined  by concen- 
tration,  though  most empirical  studies do not show a close relationship 
between concentration  and competition.  The time required  to reach  the 
new  equilibrium  is not specified,  though,  elsewhere  in  the  report,  10  years 
is mentioned  as a probable  length of time required  to achieve many of 
17. Emerson  (1988,  p. 243). 
18. Ibid. 
19. Aujean  (1988, pp. 549-57). The same volume contains  Schwalbach  (1988);  Heig 
and  Ranci  (1988);  and  Pratten  (1988). 
20. Emerson  (1988,  pp. 242-44). Merton  J. Peck  285 
the gains.21 The time path and the costs of transition are nowhere 
discussed. 
Gains in Key Sectors 
There  are so many  details and assumptions  within  the estimates that 
a full examination  of the models and their simulations  would require  an 
exposition as long as the report itself. Instead, I will focus on the 
plausibility  of the results. 
The  report  divides  the European  economy into 36 sectors, 7 of which, 
as table 2 shows, account  for about  60 percent  of the total gains. Within 
these sectors, most of the gains arise in stages 3 and  4. For example, in 
motor vehicles as much as 87 percent of the gains comes in these two 
stages-that  is, from the reorganization  of the industry  to capitalize  on 
economies of scale and from increased competition. Some of the esti- 
mated gains are extraordinary;  in motor vehicles and other transport, 
the gains are 18.7  percent  to 25.1 percent  of the GDP originating  in that 
sector.22 
Alternative Estimates  of Gains in the Automobile  Industry 
A  disturbing  aspect of  the simulations is  that different but still 
reasonable  assumptions  generate  widely varying  welfare  gains. A com- 
parison  of the gains  in the automobile  industry  for four  of eight  different 
permutations  of the Smith  and Venables  model illustrates  the point. 
In each of the four estimates, the number  of automobile  models is 
assumed  constant,  and  the number  of firms  is assumed  variable.  A major 
difference among the estimates comes from whether markets are as- 
sumed  to be segmented  or integrated.  The segmented  market  may  be the 
more realistic assumption,  for it recognizes that firms  will retain their 
market  positions in their national  markets  even after 1992. Mercedes, 
for  example,  would  continue  to be preferred  by German  consumers  more 
than by Italian consumers. With the integrated market assumption, 
consumers would be  uninfluenced  by their past consumption, and 
preferences between Mercedes and Fiat would be similar for both 
German  and  Italian  consumers. 
21. Ibid.,  p. 201. 
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Table  2. Welfare  Gains  in Key Sectorsa 
Billions of ECU except as noted 
Gains as 
Projected  Sector  percent of  Gains as percent 
Sector  gains  GDP  sector GDP  of total gainsb 
Motor  vehicles and other 
transport  17.8-23.9  95.2  18.7-25.1  14.0-12.8 
Electrical  goods  15.7-19.7  85.3  18.4-23.1  12.4-10.5 
Mechanical  engineering  11.3-14.0  82.3c  13.7-17.0  8.9-7.5 
Food, edibles, and tobacco  8.7-18.2  136.7  6.4-13.3  6.9-9.7 
Credit  and insurance  10.5-11.7  264.5  4.0-4.4  8.3-6.3 
Chemicals  9.2-15.2  80.3  11.5-18.9  7.3-8.1 
Office  machinery  6.6-6.9  28.2  23.4-24.4  5.2-3.7 
Total  79.9-109.6  772.5  10.3-14.1  63.1-58.6 
Source:  Projected  sector  and total  gains  from  Emerson  (1988,  table  A.8). Sector  GDP  from  table  C.2. 
a. Components  may not sum  to totals  because  of rounding. 
b. Highest  estimate  of the total  gains  is 187.0  billion  ECU. Lowest  estimate  is 126.3  billion  ECU. 
c.  Sector  GDP  is that  of agricultural  and industrial  machinery. 
Another  major  difference  is the choice of Cournot  or Bertrand  models 
of oligopoly. In the Bertrand  model a few rivals  already  provide signifi- 
cant  competition.  Thus  the shift  to the lesser concentration  each country 
would  face in a Community  market  does not  provide  as much  of a change 
in price as it does in the Cournot  model. Of the two, the Cournot  model 
is the better  description  of reality;  yet oligopoly produces  a wide range 
of outcomes of which the Cournot  solution  is only one. 
The wide range of estimates is unsettling, as is the selection of the 
highest  welfare  gains  for the final  report  estimates. The chosen estimate 
of 12.0  billion  ECU  for  the variant  using  Cournot  behavior  and  integrated 
markets  dwarfs the welfare gains estimated  with other versions of the 
model. Estimated  gains for the Cournot  behavior, segmented  markets 
variant  are 1.33  billion  ECU; gains  for the Bertrand  behavior,  integrated 
markets variant are 0.89 billion ECU; and gains for the Bertrand 
behavior, segregated  markets  variant  are 0.88 billion ECU.23  Clearly, 
the analysis  does not pass a sensitivity  test. 
The results of the Smith and Venables model can also be compared 
with the case study of the EC 92 Automobile  Sector undertaken  for the 
project  by Ludvigsen  Associates.24  This study estimates a cost savings 
of 2.6 billion  ECU with a single market,  a reduction  of 5 percent  in total 
23. Change  in welfare  as percent  of consumption  from  Smith  and  Venables  (1988,  table 
6). Percent  converted  to billion  ECU from  Emerson  (1988,  table  A.8). 
24. Ludvigsen  Associates  Ltd. (1988,  annex 1). Merton  J. Peck  287 
costs. Even to derive  this estimate,  which  is conservative  in comparison 
with the 12.0 billion ECU used in the report, requires  assumptions  of 
complete  realization  of economies  of scale, as determined  by engineering 
analysts, that will arise through  full cooperation  among the European 
automobile  manufacturers  in sharing  components  and parts. The gains 
in the Ludvigsen study arise mainly  through  production  economies of 
scale from "more  extensive transborder  interpenetration  of parts, com- 
ponents, assemblies,  and  built-up  vehicles." The study  projects  that  the 
number  of different  designs  by which  platforms,  or basic car  chassis, are 
manufactured  in the Community  will be reduced from 30 to 21 by the 
sharing  of platform  designs by different manufacturers.  Most of the 
realized gains from 1992  in this study are contingent  upon achieving a 
reduction in platform  designs, and volume per platform  design must 
increase an average of 50 percent to realize these economies.25  Thus, 
the study  implicitly  assumes  that  firms  are  willing  to cooperate  with  each 
other  and  to eliminate  the "unnecessary"  platform  designs.  The analysis 
does not consider  costs of adjustment  and  reorganization. 
The Ludvigsen  study  also raises the question  of the appropriate  price 
elasticity  of demand  to use for the automobile  sector. The elasticity  used 
in the Ludvigsen  study  is 1.2,26  while  that  used to estimate  the Smith  and 
Venables  model  is 1.63.  (The  elasticity  of demand  for  each differentiated 
product  used to calibrate  the Cournot  version  of the Smith  and  Venables 
model, derived from first-order  conditions for profit maximization,  is 
13  .32.)27 The higher the elasticity, of course, the greater the welfare 
gains. 
The approach  adopted in the report  assumes that the welfare gains 
flow to the consumers  in the Community.  The distribution  of the gains 
among nations is not specified. Wages are assumed to be unchanged. 
The gains come from  the elimination  of X-inefficiency  and of inefficient 
firms.  Both the considerable  reorganization  that  is assumed  to occur and 
the  effect  on wages  of increased  competition  are  discussed  subsequently. 
Alternative  Sectoral  Estimates 
Still another way of evaluating  the results of the simulations  is to 
compare them with alternative  ways of estimating  the gains. Table 3 
25. Ludvigsen  Associates Ltd. (1988,  pp. 383, 388, 395). 
26. Ibid., p. 393. 
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Table  3. Alternative  Estimates  of Gains  in Selected  Sectors 
Billions of ECU 
Barrier 
removal  and  Sectoral  Business  Price 
Sector  integration  studies  surveys  convergencea 
Agriculture  0.7-4.2  ...  ...  0.0 
Ores, metals  0.5-4.6  ...  ...  0.0 
Nonmetallic  minerals  1.0-2.6  . . .  1.4  3.3 
Chemicals  9.2-15.2  ...  1.3  9.2 
Metal articles  2.0-5.2  . . .  1.6  1.5 
Mechanical  engineering  11.3-14.0  . . .  2.0  8.1 
Office  machinery  6.6-6.9  . . .  2.3b  2.6 
Electrical  goods  15.7-19.7  . ..  2.Ic  5.6 
Motor  vehicles  14.1-17.8  2.6  2.2d  7.7 
Other  transport  3.7-6.1  . . .  1.3  2.1 
Edibles and tobacco  8.7-18.2  0.5-1.0e  2.3  14.1 
Textiles, leather,  clothing  4.4-4.7  0.7-1.3  4.0  5.9 
Timber,  furniture  1.4-1.6  .  .  .  1.5  1.1 
Paper  products  2.7-5.0  . . .  1.5f  0.9 
Building,  civil engineering  4.3-7.2  2.8  ...  19.2 
Financial  services (credit, 
insurance)  10.5-11.7  22.0  ...  7.0 
Inland  transport  1.5-1.9  5.0g  ...  0.0 
Communication  services  1.7-1.8  6.0  . . .  10.2 
Totalh  156.7  70.0  50.2  112.0 
Total as percent  of GDPi  5.4  2.4  1.7  3.9 
Source:  Barrier  removal  and integration  figures  from  Emerson  (1988,  table  A.8). Sectoral  studies  from  table  A. 1. 
Business  surveys  from  table  A.2. Price  convergence  from  table  A-9, hypothesis  2. See text for explanation. 
a. Numbers  are midpoints  of estimate  ranges. 
b. Includes  precision  equipment. 
c. Gains  in electrical  engineering. 
d. Includes  parts  and  accessories. 
e.  Does not include  tobacco. 
f. Includes  printing  and publishing. 
g. Road  transport. 
h. Total  includes  sectors  not shown  in table.  Numbers  are midpoints  of estimate  ranges. 
i. Twelve  countries,  1985  data. Numbers  are midpoints  of estimate  ranges. 
compares  the estimate of the method  used in the report  with estimates 
by three alternative  methods also mentioned  in the report:  gains based 
on studies of specific industries, findings  from business surveys, and 
gains determined  by the price-convergence  method. The price-conver- 
gence method  assumes goods and services will partially  obey the law of 
one price. Current  prices  for manufactured  goods in countries  above the 
Community  average  will come down to Community  average  prices, and 
current  prices for services will fall to the average  of the two countries Merton  J. Peck  289 
with  the lowest prices.28  (Trade  in services is regarded  as more  restricted 
than  that  in manufactured  goods, and  thus as subject  to the greater  price 
declines with a single  market.) 
That  the method  used in the report  gives much  higher  estimates than 
these three alternatives  do is not surprising,  for the model used in the 
report takes account of more effects and more sectors. It does so, 
however, only by making  heroic assumptions  and extrapolations.  Yet, 
as table 3 shows, even the more conservative alternative  approaches 
still yield positive total gains, the lowest being 1.5 percent  of GDP. 
The Magnitude  of the Overestimate 
If the estimate  in the report  is overly optimistic,  then by how much? 
To produce an alternative  estimate well-grounded  in theory and data 
would be a monumental  task, but the reader  may be entitled  to a guess 
as to the order of magnitude  of the overestimate. On the basis that 
Europe 1992 is a more comprehensive set of changes than the 1968 
elimination  of tariffs  on industrial  products mentioned  at the outset, I 
would hazard  an estimate of twice these gains-that  is, the microeco- 
nomic  gains  would  be about  2 percent  of GDP.29  I conclude  then that  the 
report  overestimates  the gains  by a factor  of two or three. 
A 2 percent  gain  is within  the range  of those produced  by the various 
alternative  methods. This more modest number  is still 66 billion ECU 
($80  billion),  a per capita  gain  of about  $250.30 
The report  emphasizes what are called dynamic gains-those  from 
greater  technological  innovation,  the effect of the learning  curve on unit 
costs, and business strategies "better suited to securing  a strong  place 
in the world market competition."'31 The increased competition and 
larger  market  of Europe 1992  are said to promote  such dynamic  gains. 
No estimate is given in the report  for dynamic  gains, even though  they 
are held to be important,  because of the view that  there  is little basis for 
estimating  their  magnitude. 
28. Emerson  (1988,  pp. 244-49). 
29. My colleague  Willem  Buiter points out that the Central  Planning  Bureau  of the 
Netherlands  (1989,  p. 538)  estimated  the microeconomic  gains  as 2.5 percent. 
30. The  $250  per  capita  estimates  are  in 1985  prices  and  should  be compared  with  $540 
for the report.  The earlier  cited  amount,  $810,  is in 1988  prices. 
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Dynamic  gains are important  because they affect the annual  growth 
rate of the Community  rather  than create a one-time gain. There may 
well be such dynamic  gains, but studies  have shown  how difficult  it is to 
raise significantly  the long-term  growth  rate  of an economy.32 
The Political Obstacles 
The task in the Cecchini  report  was to estimate the gains of Europe 
1992 on the assumption  that all the proposals for a single integrated 
market  would be accepted by the 12 member  states. It would not be a 
fair comment on the estimates in the report, then, to question such a 
bold political  assumption.  Yet the assumption  of willing, indeed enthu- 
siastic, cooperation  of European  governments  needs to be examined, 
for the character  of political cooperation of national governments is 
critical  to what Europe 1992  can achieve with microeconomic  policy. 
Industrial Reorganization 
A major source of the 1992 gains is a reorganization  of European 
industry to take advantage  of economies of scale, requiring  that the 
number  of plants  and  firms  be reduced.  In the simulations  just described, 
the number  of firms  in the Community  declines in all but two industries 
(cement, in which transport  costs are substantial,  and  office machinery, 
in which price elasticities are high). The extreme case is footwear, in 
which  207 of the 739  firms  in the Community  are predicted  to disappear. 
Some nations are almost sure to be losers in the reorganization.  For 
example, in the simulations, the United Kingdom loses 46 of its 65 
footwear firms, 31 of its 52 carpet firms, and 1 of its 3 motor vehicle 
firms.33 
The history  of industrial  policy shows that  European  national  govern- 
ments have not passively accepted the closing of firms,  but rather  have 
devised state aids to rescue some of the losers. Indeed, Europe has a 
tradition  of rescuing  national  firms  in trouble,  though  in some industries 
the decline in the number  of firms  has been accepted, particularly  for 
32. See, for example,  Denison  (1967,  p. 301). 
33. Smith  and  Venables  (1988,  pp. 316-17, 319, 329-30). Merton  J. Peck  291 
low-technology  industries  made  up of small  firms.34  Still, it is state aids 
of various sorts that explain why Europe has 12 manufacturers  of 
industrial  boilers  or 16  manufacturers  of electric locomotives compared 
with 2 firms  in each industry  in the United States.35 
The report  assumes  that  future  industrial  policy will be different.  The 
legal environment  is to change.  To restrain  or forbid  state subsidies, the 
Commission  will use its existing powers, including  its new power to 
require enterprises  to repay aid ruled illegal by the Community.  But 
inevitably  the policing  from Brussels will be limited, and, as the report 
observed, what is required  is "the demonstrable  willingness  of Member 
states  to accept  these rules  of the  game,  rather  than  conduct  long  political 
and  procedural  struggles  over illegal subsidy  regimes.'  '36 Whether  such 
a change in attitude will occur is problematic,  particularly  since one 
transgressor  among  the 12  member  nations  will encourage  others. 
Barriers from  Technical Regulations 
The same question  of political  will arises in technical  regulations  that 
now block the creation  of a single market.  The report  estimates  that  the 
gains to reducing these regulations  are substantial-about 30 billion 
ECU. (These gains are counted in stages 1 and 2 of table 1.) About 
100,000  technical  regulations  and standards  will need to be changed  or 
eliminated.  Examples  of actions  required  include  the repeal  of the Italian 
Pasta Purity law, which requires  pasta to be made entirely of durum 
wheat, and thus effectively excludes pasta from other countries. Some 
of the barriers  are not embodied in the laws themselves but are in 
standards  orcertificationforproducts.  Forexample,  in  France,  a national 
standardization  body sets specifications  for tiles that  effectively exclude 
Spanish and Italian products because nonconforming  tiles cannot be 
used in public buildings  and because most French architects  insist on 
using  tiles that  meet national  specifications.37 
34. Hall  (1986). 
35. Emerson  (1988,  p. 56). 
36. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
37. Emerson estimated  the costs of frontier  formalities,  technical  regulations,  and 
other  miscellaneous  barriers  at  40  billion  ECU,  of which  frontier  formalities  alone  comprise 
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Technical  regulations  and standards  are then still another  device that 
protects  national  firms.  The report  assumes these barriers  will crumble, 
either by the mutual  recognition  principle  by which products  lawfully 
marketed  in one member  state can be marketed  in any other or by the 
creation  of Community  standards.38  The political problems  are similar 
to those with state aid, complicated  by the real and imagined  consumer 
protection aspects of many of the existing technical regulations and 
standards. 
Public Procurement 
The preference  of governments,  in their  own purchases,  for domestic 
over foreign suppliers constitutes another significant  barrier to the 
integrated  market. According to the report, the opening up of public 
procurement  to the least-cost supplier  within  the Community  will yield 
18 billion ECU in gains (counted primarily in stage 2 of table 1), 
concentrated  in defense procurement,  telecommunications  equipment, 
pharmaceuticals,  rail  rolling  stock, and  electrical  equipment.39 
The numerical  estimates  are  based  on a combination  of price  surveys, 
interviews, and studies of particular  sectors. They include both static 
welfare gains and industry  restructuring  gains, with the restructuring 
accounting  for 40 percent  of the total  procurement  gains. Since procure- 
ment is only a small  part  of the demand  in most industries,  the opening 
up of public procurement  alone would not lead to substantial  industry 
reorganization.  In seven industries, however, ranging from turbine 
generators  to railroad  locomotives, public demand is large enough to 
create some restructuring.  Four billion ECU of the gains are in the 
defense sector, primarily  in weapons and missile systems.40  These 
savings come largely  from eliminating  duplicate  research  and develop- 
ment  in the defense programs  of the member  states. 
Again there are political obstacles, which stand out here since the 
decisions are directly those of governments. The past history is not 
encouraging.  Since about 1970  the Community  has been committed  to 
eliminating  preference  for domestic firms  in public  purchases. Specific 
directives  have been introduced  to create  common  rules  in the technical 
38. Ibid., p. 48. 
39. Ibid., p. 52;  and  W. S. Atkins  Management  Consultants  (1988,  pp. 107, 115). 
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fields, the harmonization  of award  procedures, and the advertising  of 
invitations  to bid. Even so, only 2 percent  of public  procurement  is now 
awarded  to firms  from  other  member  states. And the report  states, "the 
Commission  has found that the Community  rules are frequently  bro- 
ken.  "141 
This history  is significant,  not so much  for public  procurement  alone, 
but as a demonstration  of how difficult it is to overcome national 
nepotism.  It does not augur  well for other kinds of national  preference. 
Again, the assumption is that 1992 is to be a break from the past. 
Governments  are to think  European,  not British,  French,  or German. 
Increased  Competition and  Wages 
The  report  is silent  as to the impact  on wages of increased  competition 
in the,  product  market.  The recent experience  of the United States with 
both deregulation and greater import penetration is  that increased 
competition  in the product  market  can have repercussions  in the labor 
market.  The  most striking  change  in the United  States  was in the trucking 
industry,  in which  the premium  for  union  over nonunion  drivers  declined 
from  50  percent  to 25  percent  with  deregulation  and  the resulting  increase 
in competition.42  Deregulation  and increased import  competition also 
pushed wages down in such diverse industries  as airlines, steel, and 
automobiles. 
The  impact  on wages  of a single  European  market  could  be substantial, 
given the wide disparity  in wages between the northern  and southern 
member  states.43  Apart  from  direct  competition  between high-  and  low- 
wage  firms  in the product  market,  the U.S. experience  is that  some kinds 
of manufacturing  will tend to move to the low-wage  regions. Thus after 
World  War  II, the U.S. textile industry  moved  from  New England  to the 
South. The decision of the Ford Motor Company  to locate its newest 
parts  plant  in Spain  hints of similar  developments  in Europe.44 
41. Ibid., p. 48. 
42. Rose (1985). 
43. The 1988  average  hourly  wage in manufacturing  in West Germany  and the three 
lowest-wage  countries  was, on an index of United States =  100, West Germany,  130; 
Spain,  63; Greece,  34;  and  Portugal,  20. Dornbusch  (1989b,  table  4). 
44. "Ford Cites Labor  in Choice of Spain  for Parts  Factory," Wall  Street Journal, 
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One can then visualize a scenario in which the high-wage  plants in 
northern  Europe  begin  to close as economies of scale interact  with new 
investment  in the low-wage member  countries. Such a development  is 
most likely during  a recession in which  general  unemployment  is rising. 
National  governments  will be under  great  pressure  to take measures  to 
save local plants  and employment.  They can plead that their hands are 
tied, that  the commitment  to the Common  Market  gives them  no freedom 
of action. And yet if the pressures  become strong  enough, surely some 
enterprising  politicians  will  capitalize  upon  them.  Such  agloomy  scenario 
need not happen, though the risk is substantial.  If the single market 
creates  enough  gains soon enough  and  if the gains  are  widely distributed 
by nation  and  industry,  there  will be a basis to resist such pressures. 
One need not focus on such a crisis scenario to predict that lower- 
wage countries  of the Community  will gain  more  from  Europe 1992  than 
the high-wage  ones. The elimination  of trade barriers  will make low- 
wage countries  more  attractive  locations  for production.  Higher-quality 
labor and a better national infrastructure  that results in higher labor 
productivity  have historically  offset wage differences. Labor quality  is 
more important,  however, in some industries  than others. One would 
expect the gradual  migration  of lower-skilled  production  to the low- 
wage countries of the Community.  These are the industries  in which 
imports  from  third  world  countries  have been increasing,  and  so produc- 
tion in Spain,  Portugal,  and  Greece may  be substituted  for such imports. 
Yet there are intermediate-skill  cases, such as the Ford parts  plant  just 
cited, in which  a country  like Spain  becomes a substitute  for production 
in high-wage  northern  Europe. A trend  toward  the location  of manufac- 
turing  in the Community's  low-wage  countries  may  place a strain  on the 
political  viability  of 1992,  unless macroeconomic  policy can ensure  high 
employment. 
The Impact on U.S. Firms Operating in Europe 
U.S.  firms operating  within Community  boundaries  should benefit 
along  with Community  firms  from  the larger  market.  The elimination  of 
border formalities should mean that nations cannot single out the 
products  of U.S. firms  manufacturing  in Europe  from  those of Commu- 
nity firms.  Indeed, because many U.S. firms  are already  selling  in most Merton J. Peck  295 
of the member  states and have Europe-wide  marketing  and production 
strategies,  they may be better  positioned  to take advantage  of the single 
market  than  European  firms. 
Food products are an oft-cited example. Of the 10 largest food 
processing groups worldwide, 8 are American,  with Unilever (United 
Kingdom)  and  Nestle (Switzerland)  being  the exceptions. In the past 10 
years there has been a worldwide  consolidation  in the food processing 
industry,  with nearly 100  major  acquisitions.  The big 10  already  operate 
in most of Europe. In contrast, the 46 largest  European  companies  are 
largely tied to national  markets, with only two, Unilever and Nestle, 
operating  in all  four  of the largest  Community  countries.45  Thus, most of 
the Community  firms  will need to develop  marketing  channels  to expand 
outside their national  market,  whereas U.S. firms  have already  estab- 
lished these channels. 
The German  consumer  may not care whether  his or her soup is made 
by Campbell's  or by a Community  firm.  Clearly,  much  of the European 
business community  and  their  national  governments  do care;  they hope 
Europe  1992  will  help  European  firms,  not  what  they  regard  as interlopers 
from  the United States. 
In two areas-public procurement  and  research  support-U.S.  firms 
may  be at  a disadvantage  relative  to Community  firms.  Each  area  involves 
direct  national  government  or Community  action so that the integrated 
market  by itself does not ensure  the equal  treatment  of U.S. firms. 
Liberalization  of public procurement  is usually formulated  in terms 
of access for Community  firms. The definition  of a Community  firm  is 
left unspecified. If it is difficult, as discussed earlier, for a national 
government  to accept a company  from  a neighboring  country  on a parity 
with  one of its own in its purchase  decisions, it may  be even more  difficult 
to place a U.S. firm  on a par with a Community  firm.  There is not yet 
enough experience to evaluate whether this will be a real or imagined 
problem  for U.S. firms  manufacturing  in Europe. The best guess is that 
preference  for Community  firms  will vary among  countries  and among 
products. 
Community  firms are likely to be given preference  for Community 
research  support.  In 1987,  the Community  spent about  0.9 billion  ECU 
($1.1 billion) of its own budget on research and development, largely 
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through  programs  with marvelous  acronyms-ESPRIT (European  Stra- 
tegic Program  for Research in Information  Technology), RACE (Re- 
search in Advanced Communications  for Europe), and BRITE (Basic 
Research in Industrial  Technologies for Europe).46  These programs 
typically  involve the Community  in providing  matching  grants  to Euro- 
pean companies, universities, and research institutes for basic and 
applied research. While the absolute amount is  large, Community 
spending on R&D is only a small fraction of total European R&D 
spending,  most of which is done by private  firms  and national  govern- 
ments. 
The avowed objective of Community  R&D spending  is to improve 
European  competitiveness  in high-technology  industries  relative  to the 
United States and Japan, an objective not well served by granting 
research support  to the European subsidiaries  of U.S. firms. In fact, 
U.S. firms  have been able  to participate  in these programs,  but  according 
to one author, "there is a pervasive belief among  U.S. firms  that these 
R&D programs  are intended  for EC firms,  and the Commission,  while 
not wanting  to exclude U.S. firms  as a matter  of principle,  tries to limit 
their  participation  to areas where they can offer technology  that would 
otherwise  be unavailable."47 
While  these kinds  of discrimination  against  U.S. firms  based  in  Europe 
may be important  to particular  firms, they are not significant  for most 
U.S.  European operations. Still, a wider range of EC policies could 
reflect  a more basic attitude  that "the single market  must first  offer an 
advantage  to European  companies. This is a message we must insist 
upon  without  hesitation."48 
In an age of multinational  corporations,  it is increasingly  unclear  what 
the nationality  of such a corporation  is or, indeed, whether it has any 
nationality  at all. That may make Community  preference eventually 
meaningless.  Still, full internationalization  of corporations  seems a long 
way off, and Community  preference  could become a source of friction 
between the Community  and the United States. 
46. European  Community  Office  of Press  and  Public  Affairs  (1987,  pp.9, 12).  The sum 
cited in the text is an overestimate  of research  and development  spending  because it 
includes  some expenditures  on industry  aid, although  the largest  portion  is for R&D. 
47. Calingaert  (1988,  p. 87). 
48. Speech by Umberto  Agnelli, Italian  industrialist,  to the Royal Institute  of Inter- 
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One  response  to Community  preference  is for a non-Community  firm 
to establish a joint venture with a Community  firm, thus obscuring 
national  origins. For example, Honda has agreed  with the U.K. Rover 
group to produce Honda and Rover models in a jointly owned and 
managed  plant.49  Similarly,  the AT&T manufacturing  arm has joined 
with the Dutch company  Philips  to produce  telecommunications  equip- 
ment for the European market. Such joint ventures may become an 
important  way of creating  operations  without  nationality. 
Merger Regulation in the Integrated European Market 
The  single  integrated  market  should  increase  mergers  and  acquisitions 
since this is often the least costly way for firms  to realize economies of 
scale. Larger  markets  are one explanation  for the increase  in mergers  in 
Europe. The number  of mergers,  takeovers, and majority  shareholding 
acquisitions  involving  large firms  increased  from 117  in 1982-83  to 226 
in 1985-86.5?  There have been similar  increases in the acquisition of 
minority  shareholdings  and the creation  of subsidiaries  by large firms. 
However, given that the eighties were characterized  by a worldwide 
merger  wave, it is difficult  to establish  the  particular  impact  of the coming 
of 1992. 
The recent  pattern  has been predominantly  one of national  mergers- 
that is, the merger  of two British  or German  companies. Such mergers 
accounted  for 50 percent  of the total in 1982-83  and 64 percent  in 1985- 
86. Community  mergers,  those between two firms  in different  member 
states, and international  mergers,  those between a company  inside the 
Community  and one outside, increased in absolute terms but fell pro- 
portionately.  Community  mergers  declined  from 33 percent  of the total 
in 1982-83 to 23 percent in 1985-86; international  mergers, from 17 
percent  to 13  percent.51 
In realizing  economies of scale, a national  merger  serves as well as a 
Community  one, but a Community merger fits better the vision of 
Europe-wide  companies serving markets  throughout  the Community. 
49. "Honda  Raises  Its Stake  in Europe,"  New York  Times,  July 14, 1989,  p. Dl. 
50. Emerson  (1988,  p. 176). 
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As the report stated, of existing barriers  to cross-border  mergers, the 
biggest, "both  in terms  of launching  a cross-border  activity  and  in terms 
of the administration  and location of that activity, is believed to be 
differences in company law and tax systems."52  One task of Europe 
1992  is to reduce  or eliminate  these barriers. 
The Community  now has limited  powers to regulate  mergers  so that 
a merger,  say between  British  and  German  companies,  is subject  to veto 
by either  the German  or British  authorities  charged  in each country  with 
the regulation  of mergers  as part of national  competitive policy. The 
Commission has for some time urged the adoption of a Community 
system of notification  and control of mergers  likely to reduce competi- 
tion.53  The member states have resisted giving the Commission such 
powers, preferring  instead  to rely on their  own national  regulations.  The 
U.S. government  has expressed  concern  over the Commission's  merger 
proposals, fearing  that they would be used to give preference  to Com- 
munity  mergers  over those between U.S. and  European  firms. 
Europe  1992  is likely to increase  the pace of merger  activity. It is also 
likely to increase joint ventures, particularly  between American and 
Community  firms. But with the larger market of Europe 1992, only 
exceptional mergers  in already highly concentrated  industries  will be 
likely to threaten competition. This is  so despite the fact that the 
concentration  faced by Europe  as a whole is likely to increase,  as indeed 
it already  is. The share of the largest 400 firms  in manufacturing  sales 
increased  from  34 percent  to 37 percent  from 1978  to 1982.54  But the size 
of the market  will be expanding  greatly, and the effect of concentration 
on competition  depends  largely  on firm  size relative  to a clearly  defined 
market.  Throughout,  the report stressed increased competition  as the 
source  of major  gains  from  Europe  1992,  and  in that  the report  was surely 
correct. 
A Concluding Comment 
In my view, the Cecchini  report  overstates the microeconomic  gains 
of Europe  1992.  It will never  be established  whether  I am  right  or wrong, 
52. Ibid., p. 175. 
53. Ibid., p. 163-64.  The Commission  does have power  under  Article  86 of the Treaty 
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for the estimates are not predictions. They are estimates of long-run 
gains assuming  that  certain  actions are taken, and  it seems unlikely  that 
the complete  set of these policy actions  will be implemented.  No precise 
date was assigned  as to when the gains will be realized, so that a wager 
on the accuracy of the estimates would never come due. Further,  the 
estimates assume no dramatic  changes in the world economy as the 
single  market  is created,  and  yet surely  in the intervening  years changes 
will make  the estimates  moot. 
These strictures  may not matter.  The central  points of the Cecchini 
report  are  correct.  Creating  a single  integrated  market  for  the 12  member 
nations  will raise real incomes. It will result  in at least some reorganiza- 
tion of European  industry  to realize  economies of scale and  in increased 
competition  in many  European  industries. 
The obstacles to realizing  the microeconomic  gains of Europe 1992 
are primarily  political, a problem the report assumes away. Nations 
must resist their historic tendency to protect national  firms. The past 
record is only moderately  encouraging,  for the history of the Common 
Market's  effort  to overcome  nationalism  is marked  by two steps forward 
and  one step back. 
The entire  point of Europe 1992,  however, is that nations  are to give 
up their  old ways. They are to be committed  to making  most of Europe 
one economy. The  degree  of enthusiasm,  indeed  even fervor,  for Europe 
1992  is remarkable.  There  is a chance,  just a chance, that it will make a 
difference. 
action, however, is limited,  and hence the Commission  has sought  a provision  similar  to 
Section  7 of the Clayton  Act. Swann  (1984,  p. 138). 
54. Emerson  (1988,  table  8.2.6). 